Digital Power Investigation

Independent investigation dossier

Digital Power Investigation

Independent investigative dossier on digital infrastructure, public procurement, and security arrangements in Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Author: Digital Power Investigation

Executive summaries · American English and Serbian

BAM 57 million
Government agreement with Chinese supplier ELINC
BAM 1 million
Planned advertising tender value, before tax
12 minutes
Between the procurement plan amendment and tender notice

Figures reflect the reporting cited in the dossier. BAM is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s convertible mark, locally abbreviated KM.

01 / English (US)

Dodik’s Digital Insider: The Secret Deals and Russian Ties of Dražen Višnjić

Public money, infrastructure control, and institutional accountability.

Executive summary

This dossier examines Dražen Višnjić’s progression from police interception work and political advising to leadership of Republika Srpska’s Agency for Information and Communication Technologies (AIKT). Citing published reporting, it describes a BAM 57 million agreement between the entity’s government and Chinese supplier ELINC. Višnjić presented the project as combining Chinese hardware and software, Russian organizational methods of control and supervision, and Israeli training. An independent oversight arrangement had not been established when he publicly explained the system.

The investigation also addresses AIKT’s confirmed plans to cooperate with Mikhail Zvinchuk’s Rybar propaganda network, a questionnaire exploring sanctions workarounds and cryptocurrency payments, and a BAM 1 million advertising tender. CAPITAL reported that the questionnaire circulated from an official AIKT email address; the agency denied involvement. The cited reporting does not establish Višnjić’s authorship or a completed sanctions-evasion transaction.

Republika Srpska is an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not an independent state. Infrastructure connecting public institutions raises questions about access to citizens’ information, supplier dependence, and enforceable safeguards. The dossier calls for contract disclosure and independent scrutiny, emphasizing regional and international security implications rather than treating unresolved allegations as proven misconduct.

Key findings and questions

  • ELINC and independent oversight. The cited reporting attributes the BAM 57 million agreement to Republika Srpska’s government. Who can access the system, and which independent body can audit its operation and enforce limits?
  • Planned cooperation with Rybar. According to Detektor, AIKT confirmed plans to cooperate with Zvinchuk. Which agreements were signed, which activities took place, and what security and sanctions assessments were conducted?
  • The sanctions questionnaire. CAPITAL’s reported official-email connection and the agency’s denial leave the sender’s identity unresolved. What do message headers, server records, and account-access logs establish?
  • Advertising and competition. The BAM 1 million tender, before tax, entered the procurement plan 12 minutes before publication. Were its requirements necessary and sufficiently competitive? The cited report does not identify the eventual winner.
  • Data protection and cross-border risks. Public infrastructure and foreign partnerships raise questions beyond the entity’s borders. What independently verifiable safeguards protect citizens’ information and prevent abuse or unlawful facilitation?

02 / Srpski

Dodikov digitalni insajder: Tajni poslovi i ruske veze Dražena Višnjića

Javni novac, kontrola infrastrukture i institucionalna odgovornost.

Sažetak istraživanja

Dosije povezuje raniji rad Dražena Višnjića u presretanju komunikacija i političkom savetovanju sa njegovim rukovođenjem Agencijom za informaciono-komunikacione tehnologije Republike Srpske (AIKT). Prema izveštavanju koje istraživanje citira, Vlada Republike Srpske ugovorila je sa kineskom kompanijom ELINC projekat vredan 57 miliona KM. Višnjić ga je opisao kao spoj kineskog hardvera i softvera, ruskih organizacionih praksi i izraelske obuke. Nezavisan model sprečavanja zloupotreba tada još nije bio uspostavljen.

Drugi deo obuhvata potvrđene planove AIKT-a za saradnju sa Mihailom Zvinčukom, vođom ruske propagandne mreže Rybar. Razmatra se i upitnik o alternativnim bankarskim kanalima, zaobilaženju sankcija i plaćanju kriptovalutama. CAPITAL je izvestio da je dokument prosleđen sa službene adrese AIKT-a; agencija je negirala umešanost. Autorstvo upitnika i sprovedene transakcije nisu utvrđeni. Posebno se analizira tender za oglašavanje od milion KM bez poreza, dodat u plan nabavki samo 12 minuta pre objavljivanja obaveštenja.

Ključno pitanje nije samo cena tehnologije, nego ko ima pristup podacima, ko odlučuje o njihovoj upotrebi i ko nezavisno proverava sistem. Dosije traži objavljivanje ugovora, tehničkih ograničenja i revizorskih nalaza, uz jasno razlikovanje dokumentovanih odluka, spornih tvrdnji i otvorenih pitanja u javnom interesu.

Ključni nalazi i pitanja

  • ELINC i nezavisni nadzor. Ugovor od 57 miliona KM u citiranom izveštavanju pripisan je Vladi Republike Srpske. Ko može pristupiti sistemu i koje nezavisno telo proverava njegovu upotrebu?
  • Planirana saradnja sa Rybarom. AIKT je potvrdio planove za saradnju sa Zvinčukom, prema Detektoru. Koji su sporazumi zaključeni, koje aktivnosti sprovedene i kakve su provere bezbednosnih i sankcionih rizika izvršene?
  • Poreklo upitnika o sankcijama. CAPITAL-ov navod o službenoj adresi i demanti agencije ostavljaju otvoreno pitanje pošiljaoca. Šta pokazuju zaglavlja poruka, serverske evidencije i zapisi pristupa nalogu?
  • Oglašavanje i konkurencija. Nabavka od milion KM bez poreza uvrštena je u plan 12 minuta pre objave tendera. Da li su zahtevani kapaciteti bili opravdani i dovoljno otvoreni konkurenciji? Citirani izveštaj ne utvrđuje konačnog pobednika.
  • Zaštita podataka i širi javni interes. Republika Srpska je entitet Bosne i Hercegovine, a odluke o njenoj infrastrukturi imaju šire posledice. Koje proverljive garancije štite podatke građana i ograničavaju zloupotrebe?

Sources and approach

These summaries draw on the available portions of the linked Medium reports. The external reporting listed here is cited in the dossier but was not independently verified while preparing this summary. Documented decisions, allegations, institutional denials, and unresolved questions are distinguished. This overview does not establish legal liability.

For source references, chronology, and institutional responses, read the full investigations linked above.